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The question of substituting a presumption for section 267's prohibi-
tion is not one for the courts. The fact that Congress has enacted 267(d)
seems to imply that no other relief should be granted to intra-family
transferors, especially if such transfer is willful. When a transfer within
the economic "unit" has been forced, however, the equities of the situa-
tion, especially in the absence of a specific Congressional pronouncement,
would suggest retention by that "unit" of the original basis.
STEPHEN MASON THOMAS
Labor Law-The Legality of Co-ordinated Bargaining
Co-ordinated or coalition bargaining is a new technique in the power
struggle between labor and management. This approach to collective bar-
gaining consists of forming a multi-union negotiating committee for the
purpose of cooperation and communication among several unions that
represent employees of a common employer. Through this process the
cooperating unions hope to achieve common contract terms.' Manage-
ment has not welcomed this union practice. When co-ordinated union
bargaining extends to the bargaining table, resistance by management
has taken the form of refusing to negotiate wth joint-union committees.
The legality of union insistence on management's negotiating with
a union coalition was considered by the National Labor Relations Board
in General Electric Co.- In that case the union whose contract was to be
negotiated insisted on including members of other unions on its negoti-
ating committee. The Board held that by refusing to bargain with this
committee, General Electric was guilty of unfair labor practices.
Eight of the unions3 with which G.E. had contracts were dissatisfied
with a lack of progress in previous negotiations with that company and
therefore formed the Committee on Collective Bargaining (CCB). 4 The
objective of the CCB was to gain the cooperation in collective bargaining
of unions representing employees of a single employer in order to negotiate
major economic items on a company-wide, national level. G.E.'s labor
'See Hilderbrand, Coordinated Bargaining, An Economist's View, 19 LA-. L.J.
524 (1968).
2 173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 69 L.R.R.M. 1305 (Oct. 25, 1968).
'These eight unions became dissatisfied with the lack of union progress under
G.E.'s purported "whipsawing" tactics. Under this practice G.E. convinced the
weaker unions to accept its contract offers and then used the acceptances to bring
pressure on the stronger unions.
'69 L.R.R.M. at 1305.
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contract with the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE), a
member of the CCB, was about to expire. G.E.'s representatives walked
out of preliminary negotiations before bargaining could begin when they
discovered that IUE's committee included members of the other seven
unions constituting the CCB. The company persisted in its refusal to
meet with this multi-union commitee beyond the bargaining date specified
by the labor contract.' IUE filed unfair labor practice charges against
G.E., alleging violation of sections 8(a) (5)6 and 8(a) (1)' of the National
Labor Relations Act.8
In its argument to the Board, G.E. contended that it had no duty
to bargain with these other unions because their contracts had not expired
and because their presence prevented good faith bargaining. IUE asserted,
on the other hand, that the committee's only purpose at that time was to
negotiate a contract for IUE. The Board said that it was crucial to its
analysis of the case that G.E. had refused to bargain even before
negotiations were to begin. As a result of this refusal, the Board held
that it was not required to determine whether IUE's assertion was in fact
true. Absent proof of an agreement between these unions that would
bind the IUE to accept only those contract terms approved by the CCB,10
G.E. had a duty to bargain with the IUE's multi-union bargaining com-
mittee. Therefore, the mere presence of the non-IUE union committee
members did not justify G.E.'s walk-out and refusal to bargain. The
Board expressly limited the application of its decision by its focus on
the pre-negotiation walk-out and the lack of proof of a conspiratorial
union agreement by which IUE could accept only CCB-approved terms.
The impact of the holding, however, may in subsequent cases extend
' Also at issue was whether G.E. was guilty of unfair labor practices for refusing
to bargain before the bargaining date set by the labor contract. That question,
however, will not be dealt with here since G.E.'s refusal continued beyond the
contractually required bargaining date.
8 It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees....
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
" It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the right guaranteed by
section 7.
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
'A district court enjoined G.E.'s refusal to bargain. McLeod v. General Elect.
Co., 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), rev'd, 385
U.S. 533 (1967). The issues raised in this collateral case are not pertinent to the
problem of the legality of co-ordinated bargaining.069 L.R.R.M. at 1306-07.
20 69 L.R.R.M. at 1311.
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beyond those limits to allow use of coalition bargaining committees in
all situations, because the unions need never enter into any such binding
conspiratorial agreement in order to carry out their co-ordinated plan.
G.E. was aware of this implication and insisted that the mere presence
of members of other unions on IUE's committee justified its refusal to
bargain. Viewed in light of these considerations, the decision represents a
further development in the use of co-ordinated bargaining. This extension,
however, raises serious questions that are certain to be considered by the
courts.
The development of co-ordinated bargaining has resulted in a conflict
of valid policies, each with a statutory foundation. Section 711 of the
Act guarantees employees the right to select their own bargaining repre-
sentatives. This in turn involves the correlative right of that representa-
tive to choose the members of its negotiating committee. This right,
however, has been construed not to be absolute. It has assumed a subor-
dinate role whenever it has produced a situation that might violate section
8(d) 12 of the Act. This section, as does the entire Act generally, requires
the parties to refrain from conduct destroying the atmosphere conducive
to good faith bargaining. When a company is to bargain with an indi-
vidual union, as it is required to do, the presence of members of other
unions with which the company has contracts may have an adverse effect
on the collective bargaining atmosphere. The employer may resent the
presence of "outsiders" from unions whose contracts have not yet ex-
pired. It may in fact result in the company bargaining with a union when
it is not required to do so. The co-ordinated bargaining committee,
although properly selected by the union, may therefore present an impedi-
ment to good-faith bargaining.
The majority opinion in General Electric Co. recognized that the
rights of a union to select its bargaining representatives are not absolute,
but limited the exceptions to those rights to "unusual situations where
the chosen representative is so tainted with conflict or so patently obnox-
" Employees shall have the right to self-organization.., to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection....
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
" [T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement....
National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
[Vol. 47
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ious as to negate the effect of good-faith bargaining.' 13 In reaching its de-
cision that no unusual circumstances existed in General Electric Co., the
Board relied on two recent decisions.
In Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB,"4 the union's bargaining committee
included employees who were members of different locals, but were still
within the same international union of which the negotiating union was
a member. The company believed that this technique was an attempt to
bring about company-wide bargaining, and therefore refused to bargain
with this committee. The court affirmed the Board's holding that the
company's refusal to bargain was unjustified. This decision is distin-
guishable on its facts from the General Electric case. In Standard Oil,
there were several locals of one international union; whereas in General
Electric there were seven other different internationals represented on
IUE's committee.
The facts of American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v.
NLRB 5 are more directly in point with General Electric. The Board
had ruled that the employer was required to bargain with the union's
committee that included members of other unions.' 6 The court denied
enforcement noting that the allegedly unfair employer practice was the
mere writing of a letter suggesting the parties continue to bargain, pend-
ing the Board's determination, without the presence of the outsiders. The
company then acquiesced to the union's counter-offer for the company
to continue to bargain under protest. The court concluded that this
conduct did not add up to a refusal to bargain.'7 Since the court did not
decide the issue involved in General Electric, the decision is hardly a
strong precedent for the Board's decision in General Electric.
The Board's exceptions to the right to select one's own representative
have been limited to "unusual situations," and it failed to see anything un-
usual in General Electric. There have been only a few cases finding such
a situation as the Board has previously shown a reluctance to give effect
to that limitation. In several cases, in order to overcome this reluctance,
the courts have reversed the Board's determinations. In each case the
courts recognized the right to select one's own bargaining representative.
That right was subordinated, however, as threatening the required good
faith atmosphere.
69 L.R.R.M. at 1307.1, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963).
1 381 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1967).
10 155 N.L.R.B. 736 (1965).
11 381 F.2d at 635.
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In NLRB v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,18 the company refused to bar-
gain with a union's representative who was a former company employee.
The representative in question had been discharged by the company but
then ordered reinstated with back pay by the Board in a prior proceeding.
He declined reinstatement, however, and obtained employment as an in-
ternational representative of his local's international union. The Board
also had held in a former case that certain testimony given by this repre-
sentative against the company was untrue. He had, in addition, expressed
his purpose to destroy this company financially. 9 The Board in Kentucky
Utilities0 held that the company's refusal to negotiate constituted a viola-
tion of the right of a selected bargaining representative to choose the
individual members of its committee.2 The court of appeals reversed the
Board and emphasized that the policy of the National Labor Relations
Act was to insure an atmosphere of good faith for collective bargaining.
This policy, it was held, would be of no value if the company were re-
quired to bargain with this particular union negotiator. The Board's
decision was modified accordingly.
A former union negotiator was the company's bargaining representa-
tive in NLRB v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.22 This
representative had held highly confidential positions in representing the
union with whom he was now employed to negotiate. The time of this
change of employment was in fact close to the date on which bargaining
was to begin. An official of the company had tauntingly indicated to the
union that they had "'put one over on the union'" and had "'the union
on the spot.' ",23 The Board held that the union's refusal to bargain was
not justified in this situation.24 Here again the court of appeals, though
recognizing the rights of each party to choose its representative, refused
to find these rights "absolute or immutable."2 In denying enforcement,
the court concluded that any negotiations under these circumstances
would be in form only, without good faith.
In Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,20 the board held that a union that
is also a business rival of an employer is not a proper bargaining repre-
18182 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1950).
" Id. at 812.
" 76 N.L.R.B. 845 (1948).
' See In re Oliver Corp., 74 N.L.R.B. 483 (1947).
" 274 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1960).
"* Id. at 379.
122 N.L.R.B. 1390 (1959).
274 F.2d at 378.
2 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954).
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sentative of that company's employees. The Board stated that the mere
fact that the anticipated conflicts had not yet been realized was not con-
trolling. The latent danger was sufficient. To require the employer to
meet with this union would result in bargaining in which "at best, in-
tensified distrust of the Union's motives would be engendered.""7
In the more recent case of NLRB v. David Buttrick Co.,2" the em-
ployer refused to meet with a local union on the ground that a loan arrange-
ment by the local's international with the employer's competitor had
raised a serious conflict of interests. The Board concluded that there
was insufficient evidence of connection between the local and the loan, and
held unlawful the employer's refusal to bargain.2" The court of appeals
stated that although employees have the right to be represented by persons
of their own choosing, "there is the correlative duty of complete loyalty
of such representatives to their constituents." 30 In remanding the case
the court indicated that the Board should not be concerned with the local's
autonomy or with its connection with the loan, but rather with an assess-
ment of the potential, not merely actual, conflict of interest.
The principle to be gained from these cases is that whenever a chosen
representative has an unusually hostile interest in the negotiations, or an
independent concern therein that may result in a conflict of interest, ex-
ception may be taken if his presence threatens to disrupt good faith bar-
gaining. In applying this principle to the General Electric case, the
dissent stated:
While .. .those who represent other units may claim and honestly
intend to devote their particular skills solely to bargaining in behalf of
the employees currently under consideration, it is virtually impossible
for them to separate their own ultimate goals and problems from those
of the unit for which they are currently bargaining.3 '
A final question is the effect of co-ordinated bargaining upon the
individual bargaining units. Section 932 of the Act provides that the
bargaining unit will be that unit certified by the Board. The employer is
bound to bargain only with the duly elected representative of that certified
unit. The Board and the courts have long held that it is a violation of
27 Id. at 1561.
8 361 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1966).
-1 154 N.L.R.B. 1468 (1965).30 361 F.2d at 305.
3169 L.R.R.M. at 1312.
12 9 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
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a union's duty to bargain to insist upon an expansion or change in the
certified unit that it represents.3 This policy was expressed in Kennecott
Copper Corp., where the Board held that two separate units could not
be merged for bargaining,3 absent an election by the employees approving
such action. As stated by the dissent in General Electric:
[T]o allow representatives of other units to attend and participate in
negotiations for a unit which they do not represent may have the
effect of broadening or narrowing, at the pleasure of the unions con-
cerned, the numbers, types, and locations of the employees covered or
affected by the bargaining. This in turn would conflict with the re-
sponsibility of the Board to determine the scope of the appropriate unit
under Section 9 of the Act, and would curtail the Board's power to
enforce the good faith bargaining requirement of Sections 8(a) (5) and
8(b) (3).36
In addition to these legal questions, the practical reasons for the
union's insistence upon this new bargaining technique must be ex-
amined.3 7 Co-ordinated bargaining has had its greatest appeal where labor
has felt frustrated by the traditional individual union-management negoti-
ations.38 One of the reasons this technique was instituted by the unions
has been the numerous conglomerate mergers that have weakened the
union's position relative to management in collective bargaining. 9 As a
result of this inequality of bargaining power, the unions found that they
could increase their power by working together and maintaining a high
level of inter-union communication. Through this process the unions have
realized that to bargain effectively, they must bargain for common con-
"See, e.g., Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278 (2d
Cir. 1957); Smith Steel Workers, 174 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (1969); Hod Carriers,
Local 345, 144 N.L.R.B. 978 (1963); Painters Union, 126 N.L.R.B. 997 (1960),
enforced, 293 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961); Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n (Chicago Stevedoring), 125 N.L.R.B. 61 (1959),
uwdified and enforced, 286 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961) ;
NLRB v. Texlite, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1792 (1958), enforced sub now. NLRB v.
International Bd. of Elec. Workers, 266 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1958).
"98 N.L.R.B. 75 (1952).
"See also UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); United States Pipe &
Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1962).
86 69 L.R.R.M. at 1312. The majority did not think it necessary to discuss this
issue.
"7 See Freidin, New Collective Bargaining, 50 VA. L. REv. 1034 (1964); Lasser,
Coordinated Bargaining, A Union Point of View, 19 LAB. L.J. 512 (1968).
" Lasser, Coordinated Bargaining, A Union Point of View, 19 LAB. L.J. 512
(1968).
" Hilderbrand, Coordinated Bargaining, An Economist's View, 19 LAB. L.J.
524 (1968).
[Vol. 47
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tract terms.4 0 These union practices are not be condemned; they may in
fact be quite necessary. The legal implications of this practice, however,
may lead the courts to conclude that it presents too great a threat to good
faith bargaining and to the certified bargaining units to be sustained.
Union insistence upon employer acceptance of a coalition bargaining
committee therefore is not always protected by section 7 of the Act con-
trary to the Board's implication in General Electric. The detrimental
effect of this practice on the requirement of good faith bargaining may
have justified the employer's refusal to negotiate with that committee.
This conclusion, however, does not preclude the employer's consent to
the union's including "outsiders" on its committee. The propriety of
such consent has been recognized by the courts ;41 co-ordinated bargaining
is not illegal per se. Its use, however, should properly be limited to those
situations involving no threat to good faith bargaining.
42
RICKY LEE WELBORN
Municipal Corporations-Constitutional Law-Eviction From
Public Housing Projects
Public housing in the United States originated in the 1930's as part
of the larger effort to escape from the clutches of the Great Depression.
The Wagner-Steagall Act of 19371 signaled the entry of the federal gov-
ernment into the field of housing and, although amended many times,
remains in force today with its basic design still largely intact. Today,
more than one out of every one hundred persons in the United States lives
in federally assisted, low-rent public housing.2
"Id. According to Mr. Hilderbrand, taking wages out of competition among
unions is the most sought after goal of the unions.
" Cf. NLRB v. John J. Corbett Press, Inc., 401 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968) ; NLRB
v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966).
"' It should be noted that employers may join together in multi-employer associa-
tions for the purpose of collective bargaining, if done in good faith and with the
consent of the union, with each party retaining the right to withdraw from this
bargaining arrangement upon reasonable notice. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers, Local
449, 353 U.S. 87, (1957) ; Publishers' Ass'n of New York City v. NLRB, 364 F.2d
293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966); Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp &
Paper Mfrs., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (1967); Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B.
388 (1958).
" 50 Stat. 888 (1937), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-30 (1964), as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1402-21a (Supp. III, 1968).
'Rosen, Tenants' Rights in Public Housing, in HOUSING FOR THE POOR: RIGHTS
